Titolo

Il caso SEC-Goldman Sachs spiegato al pubblico

2 commenti (espandi tutti)

mi pare ovvio che sia una differenza importante. Considera i due scenari seguenti:

1)  Investitori con opposte visioni su una certa classe di titoli contattano GS affinché permetta loro di prendere posizione pro/contro, per esempio, i subprime.  GS crea un titolo sintetico per permettere a questi clienti di "scommettere"/assicurarsi.  Il ruolo di GS è di pura intermediazione.

2)  Paulson (o GS stessa - l'esempio funzionerebbe ugualmente bene) vuole prendere una posizione su una certa classe di titoli e incarica GS di creare un derivato su misura.  GS crea un derivato sintetico che massimizza il profitto atteso di Paulson e poi cerca qualcuno che prenda l'altro lato della scommessa.  Qui GS è in effetti un agente di Paulson!

Davvero pensi che per un investitore non faccia differenza sapere in quale dei due scenari si trova quando deve decidere a che prezzo acquistare un titolo? 

A quanto ho capito, Khuzami vuole provare  che GS ha venduto agli investitori CDO "tailored" sulle specifiche di Paulson, senza adeguata disclosure... anzi, mentendo!  Come è scritto nel blog linkato da Mario Seminerio,

 

The claim [was made that] Paulson & Co. were long $200 million dollars when they were actually short [and this] is a [clear] material misrepresentation.

questo verosimilmente vuol dire che GS è riuscita a spuntare un prezzo ben più alto di quello che investitori meglio informati avrebbero pagato... ti pare poco?

Pare che GS/Paulson non avessero nemmeno l'esclusiva su questo genere di deals...

 

The ruse at the heart of their transactions was creating subprime (so called “mezz” or mezzanine) collateralized debt obligations by investing in the riskiest layer, the so-called equity tranche. This kind of CDO consisted almost entirely of not just any subprime risk, but that of the dodgiest layer that could be sold short, the BBB tranches, via a combination of actual bonds and credit default swaps.

But Magnetar’s true objective was not to invest in this toxic waste, which its role as funder of the CDO would lead most to believe. While Magnetar paid roughly 5% of the total deal value for its equity stake, it took a much bigger short position by acting as a protection buyer on some of the credit default swaps created by these same CDOs. This insurance in turn was artificially cheap because over 80% of the deal was rated AAA. Most investors did not understand what Magnetar recognized: this concentrated exposure to the very riskiest type of bond associated with risky mortgage borrowers, each of these CDOs was a binary bet. It would either work out (in which case Magnetar would still show a thin profit) or it would fail completely, giving Magnetar an enormous profit and wiping out even the AAA investors who mistakenly believed they were protected by having other investors sit below them and take losses first. Thus the AAA investors were only earning AAA returns for BBB risk.

As the equity investor, Magnetar could further stack the deck in its favor through the influence it gained over the deals’ parameters. It was able to ensure that the CDOs held particularly dubious BBB exposures, and pushed for, and often got, “triggerless” structures, which stripped away another protection most deals had. When CDOs start to show significant losses, the payments to the lower-tier investors, including the equity tranche, are cut or halted to defend the AAA layer, much the way the human body, when exposed to severe cold, will restrict blood flow from the extremities to save the brain and organs. But triggerless deals, even as they started to fail, kept paying the lower tranche holders, including, in this case, Magnetar itself.

While these transactions may sound similar to the widely decried Goldman synthetic CDO program, Abacus, by which the firm went short various real estate exposures, effectively dumping the risk on customers, the Magnetar program was not only much larger, but also produced far more devastating systemic consequences, thanks to the distinctive structure of its CDOs.

 

Source:  http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/04/rahm-emanuel-and-magnetar-capital-the-definition-of-compromised.html

The claim [was made that] Paulson & Co. were long $200 million dollars when they were actually short [and this] is a [clear] material misrepresentation.

questo verosimilmente vuol dire che GS è riuscita a spuntare un prezzo ben più alto di quello che investitori meglio informati avrebbero pagato... ti pare poco?

OK, questo sarebbe sicuramente molto vicino alla frode, pero' Goldman nega di aver mai detto cio':

Goldman Sachs never represented to ACA that Paulson was going to be a long investor.